Several theories abound that attempt to explain the degree and extent to which human beings have and exercise “free will” in their actions. The theory I will attempt to defend in this post is that of Hard Determinism. I will begin with a brief description of Hard Determinism and provide in standard form the argument it advances. I will then address various objections to the Hard Determinism theory and show why it emerges as the most plausible theory of free will. Finally, I will explain and address the biggest threat to Hard Determinism – the notion of moral responsibility – and why this threat is hardly in a position to unseat Hard Determinism.
Hard Determinists hold that free will is incompatible with Determinism – the theory that every event or situation is causally necessitated by antecedent circumstances, that is, that the future is fixed by the past. According to Determinism, human actions are events, and thus are subject to being causally necessitated by antecedent circumstances just like any other event in the universe. If Determinism is correct, then free will is nothing more than an illusion, according to Hard Determinists. Furthermore, if we have no free will, then we cannot be held morally responsible for our actions. Thus, the argument for Hard Determinism can be posited as follows:
1. All events have causes.
2. All human actions are events.
3. All caused events are determined by the past.
4. Therefore, all human actions are determined by the past.
5. If all human actions are determined by the past, then we have no power to act other than we do indeed act.
6. If we have no power to act other than we in fact do act, then we have no free will.
7. Therefore, we have no free will.
8. If we have no free will, then we are not responsible for our actions.
9. Therefore, we are not responsible for actions.
This is certainly a very powerful and persuasive argument. Yet, while very few metaphysicians disagree over the truth of the first two premises, the remainder of the argument has traditionally been a source of major contention amongst various free will theorists.
I will now turn my attention to several objections that have been raised against Hard Determinism. The first such objection rejects P5 (and, by extension, the remainder of the argument) and goes something like this: “Humans have ‘special causal powers’ that allow them to act freely from their will; that is, I can freely choose to initiate and carry out an action or refrain from carrying out the same action, and my dual ability or capacity to do so is unique to the human species.”
Certainly, this is a good objection to Hard Determinism, and a very common one as well. However, a careful analysis reveals a series of problems with this objection that seem to build on one another. First, someone who makes this objection seemingly advocates the theory of agent-causation, the claim that a person has a unique and mysterious ability to cause an event to come about by his or her own will. This theory stands in opposition to the theory of event-causation, which claims that only events can cause other events, and which is the theory by which empirical science explains all causality that occurs in the universe. Thus, a proponent of agent-causation must necessarily account for their claim against the standard claim endorsed by most scientists.
Nevertheless, let us assume that agent-causation is plausible and that humans do indeed have this special power to will events into existence. A new problem now arises: the agent-causation theorist must explain how it is that human beings possess this special power and other beings do not, for nowhere else in nature, or indeed in the known universe, does there exist a being capable of producing events by way of will alone. What makes the human species so unique in this respect, so as to be singularly exempt from the laws of nature?
Even so, let us assume that the agent-causation theorist is correct in asserting that (i) agent-causation is plausible, and (ii) that human beings, by way of one means or another, possess a special power to will events into existence. Now the problem becomes one of explaining just what the will is. If one is to claim that the will is a part of an agent’s physical body, either in part or in whole, then we are back to where we started, for if an agent produces an action that originates within his or her physical body, then what is being described is event-causation, not agent-causation. If, on the other hand, the will is claimed to be a part or property of the agent’s mind or soul, then the agent-causation theorist must necessarily endorse sort form of dualism, in which case the mysterious causal connection between mind and body must now be explained as well, a daunting task to be sure.
Certainly, the “special powers” objection sounds good at first blush, but given the size and scope of new issues it raises, it seems much more plausible to accept the theory of event-causation, as science does, as the only acceptable explanation of causality. The Hard Determinist does accept event-causation as such, and thus does not face the additional challenges posed to the agent-causation theorist.
Before I move on to address and reply to further objections, consider the following thought experiment:
Melissa stands in the aisle of a local drugstore, seemingly unresolved about which stick of deodorant to buy from an assortment of 32 possible choices. Having been born a female, she is quickly able to eliminate all of the men’s deodorants, leaving only 16 choices. Because she was raised in an extremely poor family, Melissa adheres to a very strict budget as an adult; thus, she eliminates the sticks of deodorant with a cost of over $4, leaving only 5 choices. Her roommate had a severe allergic reaction not too long ago to one of the remaining brands, so Melissa eliminates that one, and she quickly eliminates two more because she happens to know that those particular manufacturers test their products on animals, and Melissa is quite the advocate for the ethical treatment of animals due to the many summers of her youth spent on her uncle’s farm. This leaves Melissa with a choice between the two remaining sticks of deodorant – one of which she has never even heard of before, and the other happens to be her favorite, the one she has been buying and using exclusively for the last 8 years with great satisfaction. Assuming Melissa chooses to buy her favorite deodorant, what is to be said of the freedom she exercises in making that choice? Does she choose freely? Or has her choice been causally necessitated for her by antecedent circumstances?
With Melissa’s story in mind, it is easy to see how a second objection to Hard Determinism might take the following form: “Perhaps my actions are influenced in certain ways by certain factors, and perhaps these influences motivate me to bring about a certain action. Still, it cannot be claimed that my actions are caused, only that they are merely influenced. I simply weigh these influences against one another and then freely choose which of the options before me to act on.”
This objection, like the first, appears to be a very good one. In fact, Richard Taylor raises a similar objection when he makes the following claim as part of his own objection to Hard Determinism: “There are, however, two things about myself of which I feel quite certain… The first is that I sometimes deliberate… And the second is that…it is sometimes up to me what I do.”
It certainly seems undeniable that we do in fact weigh influences and motivational factors against one another when faced with making a decision between which of two actions to bring about. The Hard Determinist, in fact, has no qualms with the claim that an action is very often preceded by an internal conflict of sorts, or deliberation, in which a person may be able to identify a set of influences “pulling” him in a certain direction, and another set of influences pulling him in a different direction.
The split, however, occurs over whether or not an influence or a motivation is, in fact, a cause. Someone in support of the second objection to Hard Determinism clearly contends that influence and motivation are distinct from causality. But is this really so? Consider Melissa, our female shopper who is contemplating which deodorant to buy. Certainly, there are many influences impacting her decision. Some of these factors are hereditary, while others are environmental; that is, some factors that influence Melissa’s decision about which deodorant to buy were present at her birth, while other factors were either (i) imposed on her by external sources throughout her childhood, or (ii) instilled in her from other experiences she has had in her past.
Whether hereditary or environmental, these factors are necessarily a part of Melissa’s past and thus form her character; therefore, they necessarily influence Melissa whenever she deliberates. There was no way Melissa could have prevented her character from being shaped or molded by these influences as she experienced them (indeed, the past cannot be changed), and there is nothing she can do about these influences at the present moment, either. Thus, Melissa is necessarily impacted by her heredity and environment in her present deliberation about deodorants.
What does this mean for Melissa? It means that she is not able to choose freely which deodorant to buy, nor is anyone else who finds themselves in her situation at the drugstore. For all those factors of heredity and environment that have made Melissa who she is have already causally determined for her which deodorant she will buy. Thus, her choice is not made freely; it was influenced beyond her control. The further objection might be made that influence is not equivalent to causation, to which I would reply that the specific influence that moves Melissa to act is, in fact, a cause. At no point does she have control over which influence moves her to action; thus, her action is not free. 18th century philosopher Baron Henri D’Holbach put it this way: “Choice by no means proves the free agency of man; he only deliberates when he does not yet know which to choose of the many objects that move him.”
Now, someone might respond to my reply concerning the “influence” objection with the following rebuttal: “Suppose the internal conflict between two competing influences within Melissa is so great that she remains torn about how to act. Is she not then free to absolve herself of the dilemma and walk out the door without purchasing any deodorant at all? Certainly, there could be no better expression of freedom of the will than to ignore all influences and simply choose to remain undecided or ambivalent.”
Such a rebuttal, I contend, carries no weight. If Melissa were to be so internally “torn” as to which deodorant to buy, then her giving up and walking out would not be an act of free will at all. All such an action would imply is that there is a greater influence – one that outweighs the influences pulling her in two different directions regarding her deodorant decision – and this greater influence is the one that moves her to action, namely, to walk out the door undecided about deodorant. The source of this greater influence might be anything from Melissa’s heredity or environment or a combination of the two. For instance, perhaps Melissa was beaten as a child by her parents every time she did something they disapproved of, and thus, as an adult, she struggles to be a decisive person, even in matters as simple as choosing a deodorant, for fear of “making a mistake.” It is certainly plausible, then, that this particular influence – whether she is consciously aware of it or not – has a greater capacity to move her to action than do any of the influences related to her deodorant-decision, and thus it moves her to walk out the door. In this way, Melissa’s decision to walk out the door is made no more freely than if she had stayed and decided between which deodorant to buy.
Furthermore, suppose Melissa is aware of her tendency to be indecisive, and suppose she resents the fact that the beatings from her parents caused her to be this way. As a result, she decides to “overcome” her compulsion to be indecisive and so decides to stay at the store until she makes a deodorant-decision. My claim still stands, because now there is simply a new greater influence that moves her to act, thereby destroying the now lesser influence to remain indecisive. Accordingly, I contend that the “influence” argument fails to prove any inconsistencies or falsities whatsoever regarding Hard Determinism. As philosopher John Hospers once famously quipped, “If we can overcome the effects of environment, the ability to do so itself is a product of the environment.”
The third objection to Hard Determinism that I wish to address I will call the “other options” objection, and it might be presented in the following way: “It certainly feels as though I could be doing any number of things right now other than what I am in fact doing. I woke up this morning and had cereal for breakfast, when I could just as easily of have had eggs. Then I took a shower, but I could have taken a bath. Then I brewed a cup of French roast coffee, although I could have brewed Italian roast instead, if I had so desired. And now I am sitting here in this chair reading your paper, but I could just as easily be taking a nap, riding a bike, washing my car, etc. If Hard Determinism is correct, then you must deny that I could be doing something other than what I am in fact doing at this very moment. How can you possibly deny this? Furthermore, how can you prove it?”
This objection is by far the most common objection to Hard Determinism. When discussing free will with someone who does not have an education in philosophy, this objection always seems to pop up within the opening moments of the discussion. And it’s popular for good reason: it fits with our common, everyday experience. It is a commonsense belief that we hold dear, perhaps closer than any other commonsense belief. When we compare this common sense belief that we feel free in some of our actions and choices to another commonsense belief that we have – namely, that whatever happens is causally determined by antecedent circumstances – many of us would rather give up the one that is backed by science rather than lose the one we hold so dear and that seemingly offers us autonomy and freedom as human beings. I mention this not to belittle the “other options” objection, but to bolster it, because I regard it to be one of the strongest possible objections to Hard Determinism.
My reply to the “other options” objection is as follows. I contend that (i) any choice you make is the only choice you could have made, given the circumstances, (ii) that the burden to prove otherwise is on you, and (iii) that it is impossible for you to prove that you could have acted otherwise. To illustrate, consider the fact that you are sitting in your chair reading this paper right now. You might say, “John, I chose to sit down and read your paper. I could just as easily be taking a nap, if I had chosen to do that instead.” But can you prove that? Can you prove that you had other options to choose from at the moment you decided to sit down and read my paper? Just the mere notion that you think you had other options doesn’t prove that you acted freely. On the other hand, I can prove that you never had a free choice to do anything but sit down and read my paper. How can I prove this? Because you are reading my paper right now. The fact that you just are reading my paper right now is all the proof I need to show that, given the circumstances, it is the only thing you could be doing right now. No other proof is required or necessary.
On your part, however, there can never be any possible proof that you could have acted otherwise because the proof required of you is precisely what never did occur. Thus, the “other options” objection is, at best, mere conjecture; it can only speculate about how the present moment might be different if the past had been different. Because the past cannot be changed, and because the present moment is precisely what it is, it is necessarily impossible for you to prove that you could presently be doing anything other than what you are in fact doing.
I will now turn my attention to the problem of moral responsibility as it pertains to the theory of Hard Determinism. In doing so, however, I believe it to be necessary at this point to make a distinction between Hard Determinism and a related yet subtlety different position on free will called Semi-Compatibilism. Hard Determinism, as we have seen, contends that Determinism is true and that there is no free will and no moral responsibility for our actions. Semi-Compatibilism, on the other hand, posits that Determinism, if it is true, is compatible with moral responsibility, but not with human freedom. The Hard Determinist, then, seemingly has an immense hill to climb, for the moral responsibility objection is certainly the biggest threat to Hard Determinism.
The “moral responsibility” objection to Hard Determinism is based on the societal necessity of having normative codes for regulating behavior; these codes exist in some form or another in every society. From the earliest known civilizations until the present time, societies have established systems of moral justification with an aim toward maintaining these normative codes, so as to ensure the preservation of humanity through time. The result of normative codes is that human beings hold one another accountable for their actions; that is, behavior that is deemed to be good or desirable by a society’s standards is rewarded with praise, while behavior that is deemed to be bad or undesirable is punished. Certainly, normative codes for behavior differ from society to society and often change over time, as do the degrees to which rewards and punishments are levied. Nevertheless, it seems as though holding people morally responsible for their actions is necessary for a civilized society to endure, or else everyone would do as they pleased and chaos would ensue.
However, moral responsibility is not easily reconciled with Hard Determinism, for one of the requirements for justifiably holding someone accountable for their actions is that they have some kind of control over their actions. Hard Determinism, as we have seen, rejects the notion that people have any control whatsoever over the antecedent circumstances from which their actions emerge. Thus, Hard Determinism seemingly must reject that we can or should ever hold people responsible for their actions. This is the basis of the “moral responsibility” objection.
In replying to this objection, my aim is to steer clear of veering off into an unbridled discussion of ethics, although the problem of how to apply moral responsibility to the puzzle of free will is where the fields of metaphysics and ethics unavoidably begin to merge. To fully remain in the realm of metaphysics, however, is to necessarily limit the way in which Hard Determinism can be defended against the threat of moral responsibility. Nevertheless, I will center my reply on the intriguing argument first suggested by Galen Strawson:
- In order to be morally responsible, an agent would have to be causa sui [a cause of itself].
- Nothing can be causa sui.
- Therefore, no agent can be morally responsible.
Strawson’s argument against morally responsibility is a valid one, but is it sound? The Hard Determinist maintains that it is. Recall the story of Melissa; Hard Determinism posits that Melissa’s character – who she is – is shaped solely by her heredity and environment and, therefore, she is not involved in the formation of her character. If she has no involvement in the formation of her character, then she cannot be responsible for her actions, for her actions necessarily emerge from her character.
According to Strawson’s argument, the only way it would be possible for Melissa to be morally responsible for her actions is if (i) she had complete control over the formation of her character, and thus, by extension, complete control over her actions, or (ii) she could change her character in such a way that did not draw on her heredity, environment, or previous experiences. Neither of these, Strawson concludes, is logically possible. Thus, his argument against the possibility of an agent being morally responsible for his actions holds.
Furthermore, there seems to be innumerable historical and cross-cultural discrepancies surrounding the notion of moral responsibility. The whole philosophical field of ethics is concerned with identifying and pinning down when, why, how, and to what extent a person should be morally responsible for his actions. There are arguably as many differences in opinion about what a person should be morally responsible for and what proper rewards and punishments should amount to, as there are people in the world.
If metaphysics aims to understand ultimate reality and ultimate truths, then it seems foolhardy to accept the position of any metaphysical free will theory that so openly and willingly endorses such a subjective and inconsistent system of moral responsibility. In this light, Hard Determinism becomes much more appealing, as it does not require the acceptance of something so subjective and inconsistent as moral responsibility, no matter the importance of moral responsibility in maintaining normative codes.
I do not claim to have a solution to the problem of irreconcilability between Hard Determinism and moral responsibility, other than to suggest that perhaps within ultimate reality there is somehow room for morality without the notion of moral responsibility, as we currently understand and enforce it. However, I admittedly have no idea what such a system would look like, or how it would be worked into a structure efficacious for maintaining normative codes.
Nevertheless, I believe I have shown the argument for Hard Determinism to be a very strong one. I have also shown that it can stand up to a variety of objections. Finally, I hope that I have shown that there are significant problems inherent in the notion of moral responsibility that are sufficient enough to give us concern regarding the validity we naively afford it. For so long as the validity of moral responsibility is even slightly in doubt, Hard Determinism stands a serious chance.
open mouth, say things. 